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The selfish life-cycle model or hypothesis is, together with the dynasty or altruism model, 
the most widely used theoretical model of household behavior in economics, but does 
this model apply in the case of a country like Japan, which is said to have closer family 
ties than other countries? In this paper, we first provide a brief exposition of the simplest 
version of the selfish life-cycle model and then survey the literature on household saving 
and bequest behavior in Japan in order to answer this question. The paper finds that 
almost all of the available evidence suggests that the selfish life-cycle model applies to 
at least some extent in all countries but that there is more consistent support for this 
model in Japan than in the United States and other countries. It then explores possible 
explanations for why the life-cycle model is more consistently supported in Japan than 
in other countries, attributing this finding to government policies, institutional factors, 
economic factors, demographic factors, and cultural factors. Finally, it shows that the 
findings of the paper have many important implications for economic modeling and for 
government tax and expenditure policies. 
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The selfish life-cycle model or hypothesis is, together with the dynasty or altruism model 
of Barro (1974) that assumes the presence of intergenerational altruism, the most widely 
used theoretical model of household behavior in economics. Many researchers have 
investigated whether or not this model applies in North America, Europe, and elsewhere  
(see, for example, Modigliani (1975), Deaton (1992, 2005), Browning and Lusardi 
(1996), Hayashi (1997b), Attanasio (1999), Browning and Crossley (2001), Baranzini 
(2005), Attanasio and Weber (2010), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017) for useful 
surveys). However, whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of a 
country like Japan, which is said to have closer family ties than other countries is another 
question.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief exposition of the simplest version of the 
selfish life-cycle model and to then survey the literature on household saving and 
bequest behavior in Japan to shed light on whether or not the selfish life-cycle model 
applies in the case of Japan. There have been many comprehensive surveys of the 
literature on household saving, consumption, and bequest behavior in Japan (for 
example, Hayashi (1986, 1992, 1997a), Horioka (1984, 1990, 1993, 2008a), and Ogawa 
and Horioka (1996)), but this paper is unique in focusing on the question of whether or 
not the selfish life-cycle model applies and in surveying the literature on a wide variety 
of approaches including not only studies of saving behavior (e.g., studies of the impact 
of the age structure of the population on the saving rate, the saving behavior of the retired 
elderly, saving motives, and the importance of borrowing (liquidity) constraints) but also 
studies of bequest behavior (e.g., studies of the prevalence of bequests, bequest motives, 
and tests of altruism). I emphasize my own research because, over the years, I have tried 
a variety of approaches to test the validity of the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
One view that has its adherents even today is that the laws of Western economics 
(including the selfish life-cycle model) do not apply in the case of Japan, that the 
Japanese are not rational utility maximizers, and that the economic behavior of the 
Japanese is largely determined by the country’s unique culture and social norms, 
especially its Confucian heritage (see Morishima, 1982, and Katzner, 1999, 2008).1 For 
example, a common view is that Japan’s high household saving rate is attributable to 
national character, culture, or Confucian teachings concerning frugality (see, for 
example, Horioka, 1990, 2019, Garon, 1997, pp. 164-165). Thus, it is of great interest 
to examine whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of a non-
Western country such as Japan despite enormous differences in culture and social norms. 
 
To preview the main findings of this paper, it finds that almost all of the available 
evidence suggests that the selfish life-cycle model applies at least to some extent in all 
countries but that there is more consistent support for this model in Japan than in the 
United Sates and other countries. Thus, the answer to the question posed in the title of 
 
1 See Guiso, et al. (2006) for a more general discussion of how culture affects economic outcomes 
by affecting people’s beliefs, values, or preferences and for a brief discussion of the impact of 
religiosity (an important component of culture) on attitudes toward thrift and actual saving behavior. 
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this paper is an unqualified “yes.” The paper then explores possible explanations for why 
the selfish life-cycle model is more consistently supported in Japan than in other 
countries, attributing this finding to government policies, institutional factors, economic 
factors, demographic factors, and cultural factors. Finally, it shows that the findings of 
the paper have many important implications for economic modeling and for government 
tax and expenditure policies. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: we provide a brief exposition of the simplest version 
of the selfish life-cycle model in section 2; we survey the literature on the impact of the 
age structure of the population on the saving rate in section 3, that on the saving behavior 
of the retired elderly in section 4, that on saving motives in section 5, that on the 
prevalence of bequests in section 6, that on bequest motives in section 7, that on tests of 
altruism in section 8, and that on the importance of borrowing constraints in section 9; 
we explore possible explanations for why there is more consistent support for the selfish 
life-cycle model in Japan than there is in other countries in section 10; and we summarize 
our findings and discuss the implications thereof for economic modelling and for 
government tax and expenditure policies in section 11. 
 
 
2. The Selfish Life-Cycle Model 
 
In this section, we provide a brief exposition of the simplest version of the selfish life-
cycle model, which is primarily attributable to Franco Modigliani and his collaborators 
(for more details, see Modigliani and Brumberg (1954, 1980), Ando and Modigliani 
(1963), Modigliani (1966), Modigliani (1975), Baranzini (2005), and Deaton (2005)).  
 
In a nutshell, this model assumes that individuals are rational, forward-looking, and 
selfish, that they maximize their own lifetime utility subject to a lifetime budget 
constraint, and that they neither receive nor leave bequests and other intergenerational 
transfers. Since most individuals retire at some point in their lives, this model requires 
individuals to save part of their earnings during their working years to prepare for living 
expenses during retirement and to finance their living expenses during retirement by 
drawing down (decumulating) their previously accumulated assets. 
 
In order to simplify the model as much as possible, we ignore the childhood years and 
assume that individuals graduate from school and start working at age 0 and that they 
work from age 0 until age R, earning Y yen each year, part of which they use to finance 
their current consumption and part of which they save in preparation for their living 
expenses during retirement. We further assume that individuals retire at the exogenous 
retirement age R, that they finance their living expenses during retirement by drawing 
down their previously accumulated assets, and that they die with certainty at age L. 
Finally, we assume that individuals smooth their consumption throughout their lives, 
consuming C yen per year from age 0 until age L, and that they are selfish, receiving no 
bequests or inter vivos transfers from their parents and leaving no bequests or inter vivos 
transfers to their children (see Figure 1). 
 
If we assume that the interest rate is zero for the sake of simplicity, these assumptions 
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imply that lifetime income will be Y*R and that lifetime consumption will be C*L. Thus, 
the lifetime budget constraint can be expressed as follows: 
  
(1)     Y*R = C*L  
 
If equation (1) is solved for C, we can obtain the following expression for C, which 
denotes the annual amount of consumption:  
 
(2)     C = (R/L)*Y 
 
In words, consumption will be a constant fraction of income, with that fraction being 
equal to the ratio of one’s working years to total lifespan. 
 
SW, the annual saving of working individuals can be calculated by subtracting 
consumption C from income Y and substituting the expression in equation (2) for C: 
 
(3)     SW = Y – C = (1 – R/L)*Y = ((L – R)/L)*Y 
 
In words, the saving of working individuals will be a constant fraction of their income, 
with that fraction being equal to the ratio of their retirement span to total lifespan.  
 
Moreover, since individuals are assumed to work for R years, CSW, the cumulative 
saving of working individuals, is as follows: 
 
(4)     CSW = R*((L – R)/L)*Y = (L – R)*(R/L)*Y 
 
As for retired individuals, since they have no income but need to consume, their 
consumption will be financed entirely by drawing down their previously accumulated 
saving. Thus, SR, the annual (dis)saving of retired individuals, is as follows: 
 
(5)     SR = – C = – (R/L)*Y 
 
Moreover, since the retirement span of retired individuals is (L – R) years, CSR, the 
cumulative (dis)saving of retired individuals, is as follows: 
 
(6)     CSR = – (L – R)*(R/L)*Y  
 
As can be seen by comparing equations (4) and (6), the cumulative saving of working 
individuals and the cumulative (dis)saving of retired individuals are precisely equal to 
one another in absolute value but have opposite signs. This confirms that the lifetime 
budget constraint of individuals is satisfied. This is the same as saying that the area of 
the rectangle showing the cumulative saving of individuals during their working years 
is exactly equal to the area of the rectangle showing the cumulative (dis)saving of 
individuals during their retirement years in Figure 1. 
 
Next, we wish to derive the saving amount and saving rate of the household sector as a 
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whole on the assumption that all households are identical. From equations (3) and (5), 
AS, the aggregate saving of the household sector as a whole, is as follows: 
 
(7)     AS = POP(0, R)*((L – R)/L)*Y – POP(R, L)*(R/L)*Y, 
 
where POP(0, R) = the population aged 0 to R (the working-age population) 
  POP(R, L) = the population aged R to L (the retirement-age population) 
  
Furthermore, AY, the aggregate income of the household sector as a whole, is as follows: 
 
(8)    AY = POP(0, R)*Y 
 
Thus, ASY, the saving rate of the household sector as a whole, is as follows: 
 
(9)    ASY = AS/AY = (L – R)/L – [POP(R, L)/POP(0, R)]*(R/L) 
 
In other words, the saving rate of the household sector as a whole should be a function 
of the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population, and the 
higher is this ratio, the lower should be the household saving rate. Moreover, the 
derivative of the household saving rate with respect to this ratio should equal the 
negative of the ratio of one’s working years to total lifespan.  
 
Thus, we can test whether the selfish life-cycle model applies in the real world by 
examining whether or not the age structure of the population (in particular, the ratio of 
the retirement-age population to the working-age population) has the expected impact 
on the household saving rate.  
 
Thus far, we have simplified our theoretical model by making the following 
assumptions: 
 
(1) There is no economic growth. 
(2) There is no public old-age pension system. 
(3) There is no lifespan uncertainty. 
 
The age structure of the population will have an impact on the household saving rate 
even if these simplifying assumptions are relaxed, but what will change is that now other 
factors will also affect the household saving rate.  
 
(1) If the economy is growing, cohorts born later will have higher lifetime 
incomes than cohorts born earlier, and thus the aggregate saving of cohorts 
that are working and saving will exceed the aggregate dissaving of cohorts that 
are retired and dissaving in absolute value. As a result, if the economy is 
growing, the aggregate saving of the household sector as a whole will be 
positive, and the higher is the economic growth rate, the greater will be the 
aggregate saving of the household sector as a whole. 
 
(2) If a public old-age pension system is introduced, there will be less need to save 
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in preparation for living expenses during retirement, and thus one would 
expect the saving of working-age individuals and the (dis)saving of retired 
individuals to be less than in a world with no public old-age pension system 
(see, for example, Feldstein (1974)).  
 
(3) If lifespan is uncertain and individuals are risk-averse, one would expect the 
saving of working-age individuals to be greater and the dissaving of 
retirement-age individuals to be less than in a world with no lifespan 
uncertainty because individuals will be afraid of running out of money before 
they die (see Davies (1981)). This will lead individuals to leave unintended or 
accidental bequests unless they are able to completely annuitize their wealth. 
 
 
3. Evidence on the Impact of the Age Structure of the Population on the Saving 
Rate 
  
As we showed in the previous section, if the selfish life-cycle model applies, the 
household saving rate should be a decreasing function of the ratio of the retirement-age 
population to the working-age population. Thus, we can shed light on the applicability 
of the selfish life-cycle model by investigating whether or not the age structure of the 
population has the expected impact on the saving rate. 
 
The author has used various types of data to investigate the impact of the age structure 
of the population on the saving rate, and in this section, we survey this body of work and 
consider whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. In 
subsection 3.1, we discuss papers that make use of cross-country or cross-provincial data, 
while in subsection 3.2, we discuss papers that make use of time-series data for Japan. 
 
 
3.1. Evidence based on Cross-Country and Cross-Provincial Data 
 
Horioka (1986, 1989) uses data on the member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the 1975-84 period from the 
OECD to analyze the determinants of the private saving rate and finds that the ratio of 
the retirement-age population to the working-age population has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the private saving rate. 
 
Based on his estimation results, Horioka (1986, 1989) calculates the contribution of each 
factor to the difference between Japan’s private saving rate and the OECD-wide average 
and to the U.S.-Japan saving rate gap (see Table 1). During the 1975-84 time period, 
Japan’s population was the youngest and her retirement-age population to working-age 
population ratio was the lowest among all OECD member countries at the time, and as 
Table 1 shows, this can explain virtually all of the difference between Japan’s private 
saving rate and the OECD-wide average and about half of the U.S.-Japan saving rate 
gap. 
  
Similarly, Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2012) use panel data on twelve Asian 
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countries for the 1966-2007 period from Penn World Tables to analyze the determinants 
of the domestic saving rate, and as in the case of Horioka (1986, 1989), they find that 
the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on the domestic saving rate. 
 
Finally, Horioka and Wan (2007) use provincial panel data for the 1995-2004 period 
from a household survey to analyze the determinants of the household saving rate in 
China and find that the impact of the ratio of the retirement-age population to the 
working-age population is negative, as expected, but often not statistically significant.  
 
The reader is referred to Loayza, Schmid-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) for a survey of 
more recent research and for a comprehensive econometric analysis. Virtually all of the 
papers surveyed in this paper as well as the analysis in this paper itself find, as expected, 
that the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the private saving rate. 
 
 
3.2. Evidence based on Time-Series Data 
 
Horioka (1997) uses time-series data for the 1955-93 period from Japan’s National 
Accounts to analyze the determinants of Japan’s household saving rate and finds that 
there is a cointegrating relationship between the household saving rate and the ratio of 
the retirement-age population to the working-age population and that this ratio has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the household saving rate (see Horioka 
(1991) and Koga (2006) for similar studies for Japan and Modigliani and Cao (2004) for 
a similar study for China, all of which obtain broadly consistent results). 
 
Figure 2 shows trends over time in National Accounts data on Japan’s household saving 
rate for the 1955-2018 period, and as can be seen from this figure, Japan’s household 
saving rate showed a steady upward trend from 1955 until the mid-1970s, peaking at 
23.2%, and showed a steady downward trend thereafter, sometimes even becoming 
negative. 
 
The ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population in Japan has 
shown a steady upward trend over time so Horioka’s (1997) finding that this ratio has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the household saving rate implies that the 
upward trend in this ratio can explain the downward trend in Japan’s household saving 
rate since the mid-1970s and that further increases in this ratio will cause further declines 
in Japan’s household saving rate in future years (see Horioka (1989, 1992)). 
 
As for why Japan’s household saving rate showed a steady upward trend from 1955 until 
the mid-1970s, Horioka (2008a) argues that it was due to the steady downward trend in 
the ratio of minors (those aged 0 to 19) to the working-age population during the same 
period, which in turn was due to the decline in the fertility rate. The ratio of minors to 
the working-age population would be expected to have a negative impact on the 
household saving rate, as in the case of the ratio of the retirement-age population to the 








In this section, we showed that the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-
age population has a negative and statistically significant impact on the saving rate 
whether one uses cross-country data or time-series data. This not only suggests that the 
selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan but also that the low ratio of the 
retirement-age population to the working-age population can explain why Japan’s 
household saving rate was so high in the past and that the sharp increase in this ratio can 
explain the sharp decline in Japan’s household saving rate since the mid-1970s. Thus, 
the selfish life-cycle model can explain the level of, as well as trends over time in, 
Japan’s household saving rate. However, we should note that the selfish life-cycle model 
is not the only theoretical model that predicts that the age structure of the population 
will have a significant impact on the household saving rate and thus that, although we 
can conclude that the evidence is consistent with the selfish life-cycle model, we cannot 
assert that we have unequivocably established that the selfish life-cycle model applies 
in the case of Japan.   
 
 
4. Evidence on the Saving Behavior of the Retired Elderly 
 
The selfish life-cycle model assumes that working individuals save and that retired 
individuals dissave. Thus, we can shed light on the applicability of the selfish life-cycle 
model by examining the saving behavior of the retired elderly (see Weil (1994) and De 
Nardi, French, and Jones (2016) for excellent surveys of this literature). In this section, 
we survey studies that examine the saving behavior of the retired elderly in Japan and 
consider whether or not their findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model.  
 
All of the papers we surveyed find that the retired elderly in Japan dissave, at least after 
a certain age, which constitutes evidence in favor of the selfish life-cycle model. For 
example, Hayashi, et al. (1988) carefully analyze household-level data from the 
“National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure,” which is conducted every five 
years by the Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications and find that the elderly start dissaving after the age of 80 whether they 
live in nuclear households or extended (three-generation) households. However, Hayashi, 
et al. (1988) do not take account of the employment status of respondents, and if they 
had confined their sample to the retired elderly, they are likely to have found that the 
Japanese elderly start dissaving at an earlier age.  
 
Horioka (2006, 2010) and Horioka and Niimi (2017) analyze tabulated data on the 
retired elderly from the “Family Income and Expenditure Survey,” which is conducted 
by the Statistic Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
and find that the saving rate of such households has fluctuated in the -40 to -10% range 
and that their decumulation rate of financial assets has fluctuated in the 1 to 3% range 
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since 2000.2 These findings constitute convincing evidence that the retired elderly in 
Japan are dissaving and suggest that the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of 
Japan (see also Horioka, et al. (1996), Horioka and Niimi (2017), and Niimi and Horioka 
(2019)). 
 
However, we should note that the selfish life-cycle model is not the only theoretical 
model that predicts that the retired elderly should dissave and thus that, although we can 
conclude that the evidence is consistent with the selfish life-cycle model, we cannot 
assert that we have unequivocably established that the selfish life-cycle model applies 
in the case of Japan. 
 
 
5. Evidence on Saving Motives 
 
The simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model implies that individuals should be 
saving primarily for living expenses during retirement and that they should not be saving 
to leave bequests to their children. Thus, we can shed light on the applicability of the 
selfish life-cycle model by looking at the relative importance of saving for individual 
motives. In this section, we survey studies that attempt to estimate the contribution of 
saving for each motive to total household saving in Japan and other countries and 
consider whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. Our 
findings support the selfish life-cycle model because they show that saving for life-cycle 
motives such as retirement are much more important than saving for bequests in Japan 
as well as in many other countries.  
 
Before turning to our findings, however, let us first explain the methodology we used to 
calculate the amount of saving for each motive. If individuals cannot realize a given 
motive with only their current income, they need to rely on saving. Moreover, at any 
given time, there will be individuals who are saving in order to prepare for a given 
motive as well as individuals who are dissaving to realize the same motive. For example, 
at any given time, there will be pre-retirement individuals who are saving for retirement 
as well as post-retirement individuals who are dissaving for retirement. Thus, the 
contribution that saving for a given motive makes to aggregate household saving is net 
saving for that motive, which can be calculated as gross saving for that motive minus 
dissaving for that motive. Mathematically,  
 
(10)    NS = net saving for a given motive = GS – DS 
 
where GS = gross saving for a given motive  
       DS = dissaving for a given motive  
 
Furthermore, there are two ways in which one can use saving to help realize a given 
 
2  Horioka and Niimi (2017) and Niimi and Horioka (2019) point out that the rate of wealth 
decumulation of the retired elderly in Japan is slower than one might expect but show that this can 
be explained by the presence of precautionary saving and bequest motives, especially the former. 
See Ventura and Horioka (2020) for a similar analysis of the determinants of the saving behavior of 
the retired elderly in Italy. 
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motive. The first way is to rely on one’s own assets, and in the case of this way, one 
accumulates the financial assets needed to realize the motive in question beforehand and 
draws down those assets in order to realize that motive. The other way is to rely on 
borrowing, and in this case, one borrows the funds needed to realize the motive in 
question, uses those funds to realize that motive, and repays the loan little by little after 
realizing the motive (note that loan repayments (repayment of the principal only) are a 
form of saving). What should be noted is that the saving is done before the realization 
of the motive when one relies on one’s own wealth and that it is done after the realization 
of the motive when one relies on borrowing． 
 
The gross saving and dissaving for a given motive in the case of the two financing 
methods are shown in Table 2, and as can be seen from this table, the gross saving for a 
given motive equals the sum of saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets 
and saving in the form of loan repayments. Similarly, dissaving for a given motive equals 
dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets and dissaving in the form 
of new borrowings.3 Moreover, as noted earlier, net saving for a given motive equals 
gross saving for that motive minus dissaving for that motive.  
 
The former Institute of Posts and Telecommunications Policy of the former Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications of the Japanese Government conducted a number of 
surveys of household saving behavior including the “Survey of the Financial Asset 
Choice of Households,” which was conducted in Japan every two years, and the “U.S.-
Japan Comparison Survey of Saving,” which was conducted simultaneously in the 
United States and Japan in 1996. Both of these surveys are unique in asking respondents 
to provide information on the amount of saving, dissaving, new borrowings, and loan 
repayments for each motive. Horioka and Watanabe (1997, 1998) and Horioka, et al. 
(1998, 2000) use the methodology described above in conjunction with data from the 
1994 “Survey of the Financial Asset Choice of Households” and the 1996 “U.S.-Japan 
Comparison Survey of Saving,” respectively, to calculate the contribution of saving for 
each motive to aggregate household saving (see Horioka (1985) for an analysis of saving 
for one’s children’s educational expenses, Horioka (1987) and Grossbard (2015) for an 
analysis of saving for one’s children’s marriage expenses, Horioka (1988) for an analysis 




3 The only exception to this rule is in the case of the housing purchase. A household purchasing 
housing will decumulate financial assets in order to pay for the down payment and will incur new 
borrowings (a mortgage) to pay for the remainder of the cost of the house, but dissaving in these two 
forms will be exactly offset by saving in the form of the accumulation of real assets (viz., housing). 
Thus, no dissaving will occur at the time of housing purchase, but dissaving will occur after the 
purchase of the house in the form of depreciation.  
 
4 It should be noted that saving for the various motives are often interrelated. For example, as noted 
by Wei and Zhang (2011), Du and Wei (2013), and Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2017), the 
marriage and housing motives are closely related in China and the Republic of Korea because it is 
common practice in these countries for parents with sons to buy housing for their sons in preparation 
for their marriage. 
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Table 3 shows data from Horioka and Watanabe (1997, 1998) and Horioka, et al. (1998, 
2000) on the contribution of net saving for each motive to total household saving from 
the two aforementioned surveys. If the selfish life-cycle model applies, individuals 
should be saving primarily for the retirement motive, and as this table shows, net saving 
for the retirement motive accounts for a full 62.23-62.50% and 30.84% of total 
household saving in Japan and the United States, respectively, and that it is by far the 
dominant component of household saving in both countries. Thus, the selfish life-cycle 
model seems to apply in both countries. However, the share of retirement-related saving 
in Japan is more than twice what it is in the United States, which suggests that the selfish 
life-cycle model applies to a much greater extent in Japan than it does in the United 
States.5 
  
If the simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model applies, individuals should not 
leave a bequest to their children and should therefore not be saving in order to leave a 
bequest to them. As can be seen from Table 3, the share of net saving for the bequest 
motive is 1.50-3.23% in Japan and 5.04% in the United States, and thus its share is low 
in both countries but especially in Japan. Thus, our findings concerning saving for the 
bequest motive also suggest that the selfish life-cycle model applies in both Japan and 
the United States but that it is especially applicable in the case of Japan.6  
 
A closely related paper is Gourinchas and Parker (2002), which analyzes how the 
proportions of precautionary saving (buffer saving) and retirement saving (life-cycle 
saving) evolve over the life cycle using data for the United States and finds that 
precautionary saving decreases sharply with age whereas retirement saving increases 
sharply with age and that precautionary saving comprises the lion’s share of the target 
level of liquid wealth until about the age of 40. 
 
Another closely related paper is Schunk (2009), which uses micro data from the SAVE 
data set to analyze motives for saving in Germany. Schunk (2009) finds that the most 
important motive for saving in Germany is the precautionary motive, with 62% of 
respondents feeling that this motive is “very important,” followed by the old-age 
provision motive (59%), the motive to purchase a house (36%), and the bequest motive 
(20%). Horioka, et al. (1998, 2000) presents roughly comparable data on the proportion 
of respondents saving for each motive, and they find that the most important motive is 
the retirement motive in both the United States and Japan, with 48.6% and 45.2% of 
respondents saving for this motive in the two countries, respectively, and that the bequest 
 
5 The second most important saving motive is the precautionary motive in both countries. Readers 
may be confused about why the share of net saving for housing purchase is negative in Japan. The 
reason is that dissaving for housing purchase is greater in absolute value than gross saving for 
housing purchase in Japan and the reason for this, in turn, is that housing is less durable in Japan due 
to differences in construction materials and thus that the depreciation of housing is greater in Japan.  
 
6 Note, however, that saving for one’s children’s education and marriage expenses also involve 
intergenerational transfers and that the share of net saving for these two motives is much higher in 
Japan than in the United States (16.08-16.45% vs. 2.73%). Thus, the share of net saving involving 
intergenerational transfers is also much higher in Japan than in the United States (17.58-19.68% vs. 
7.77%).    
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motive is far less important, with only 10.8% and 3.6% of respondents saving for this 
motive in the two countries, respectively. Thus, the retirement motive is much more 
important than the bequest motive in all three countries, but the ratio between the two is 
lowest in Germany (59% vs. 20%), intermediate in the United States (48.6% vs. 10.8%), 
and highest in Japan (45.2% vs. 3.6%). 
 
Yet another closely related paper is Yao, et al. (2011), which compares saving motives 
in China and the United States. Unfortunately, they do not consider saving for the 
bequest motive, but they find that saving for the retirement motive is more important for 
Chinese households than for American households in the lower income quantiles and 
that saving for the education motive is more important for Chinese households than for 
American households in all income quantiles. These results suggest that Chinese 
households are more similar to Japanese households than to American households in 
terms of the relative importance of saving for the retirement (and education) motives. 
 
Yet another closely related paper about China is Chao, et al. (2011), which finds that the 
life-cycle hypothesis can explain only 35% of the surge in Chinese household saving but 
that by adding to the model the strong motivation of young adults for buying a home and 
the financial support they receive from their parent for that purpose, their model can 
reproduce the high and increasing level of household saving since the mid-nineties. 
 
Finally, Birkeland (2013) analyzes the saving motives of Dutch households and finds 
that saving for the precautionary motive is the most important motive for Dutch 
households, that saving for the retirement motive is the second most important motive, 
and that the inter vivos transfer motive and the bequest motive are less important.  
 
To summarize, our findings concerning saving motives suggest that the selfish life-cycle 
model applies in all countries but that it applies to a greater extent in Japan (and perhaps 
also in China and the Netherlands) than it does in the United States and Germany. 
 
 
6. Evidence on the Prevalence of Bequests 
 
The simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model assumes that individuals do not leave 
any bequests or other intergenerational transfers to their children so we can shed light 
on the applicability of the selfish life-cycle model by looking at the prevalence of 
bequests and other intergenerational transfers. In this section, we survey the literature 
on the prevalence of bequests and other intergenerational transfers in Japan and other 
countries and consider whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-
cycle model. 
 
The most commonly used measure of the importance of bequests and other 
intergenerational transfers is the share of such transfers in total household wealth. This 
measure was first used by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), and they obtained the 
shocking result that the share of intergenerational transfers in total household wealth 
amounts to a full 46 to 81 percent. Subsequently, many researchers have calculated this 
share using a variety of methodologies and data sources for a large number of countries. 
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Davies and Shorrocks (2000) survey this literature and conclude that the majority of 
studies find that this share is 35 to 45% in the United States, roughly comparable to the 
United States in Canada, and somewhat higher in France.  
 
Moreover, a number of researchers have tried to calculate the share of intergenerational 
transfers in total household wealth for the case of Japan. For example, Hayashi (1986) 
estimates this share to be at least 9%, Dekle (1989) estimates it to be 3-49%, Barthold 
and Ito (1992) estimate it to be at most 25-40%, Campbell (1997) estimates it to be 23-
28%, and Horioka (2008b,c and 2009) estimates it to be 15-18%. Thus, this share 
appears to be lower in Japan than it is in the United States and other countries, which 
suggests that bequests and other intergenerational transfers are less important 
quantitatively in Japan than they are in other countries. Thus, the findings concerning 
the quantitative importance of bequests also suggest that the selfish life-cycle model 
applies to a greater extent in Japan than it does in other countries. 
 
Another approach for gauging the importance of bequests and other intergenerational 
transfers is to look not at the amounts of bequests actually left behind but to ask 
individuals about their bequest intentions. Osaka University has been conducting a 
household survey called the “Preference Parameters Study” in four countries (China, 
India, Japan, and the United States) since 2003, and fortunately, this survey contains 
several questions about bequests. The bequest data from this survey are analyzed in 
detail in Horioka (2014a,b), and as can be seen from these papers, the proportion of 
respondents planning to leave a bequest to their children is by far the highest in India 
(87.05%), also relatively high in the United States (60.77%) and China (56.35%), and 
by far the lowest in Japan (31.44%). These findings reinforce our earlier conclusion that 
bequests are less prevalent in Japan than in other countries and that the selfish life-cycle 
model applies to a greater extent in Japan than it does in other countries. However, we 
should note that there is substantial heterogeneity in all countries and that, even in Japan, 
a substantial minority of households (nearly one-third) plan to leave bequests. 
    
 
7. Evidence on Bequest Motives 
 
In the previous section, we presented our findings concerning the prevalence of bequests 
and other intergenerational transfers and concluded that they are less prevalent in Japan 
than in other countries. However, even if the selfish life-cycle model applies, individuals 
may still leave bequests and other intergenerational transfers to their children, and thus, 
even if we find that individuals do leave bequests and other intergenerational transfers 
to their children, we cannot make a determination about the applicability of the selfish 
life-cycle model unless we know the reasons for which individuals leave bequests and 
other intergenerational transfers to their children. Thus, in this section, we present 
evidence on the motives for which individuals leave bequests and other intergenerational 
transfers to their children in Japan and three other countries and consider whether or not 
the findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
If individuals are selfish, as assumed by the life-cycle model, they should either leave 
no bequests at all, leave only accidental or unintentional bequests arising from lifespan 
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uncertainty, or selfish motivated bequests (see Arrondel and Masson (2006) and 
Laferrère and Wolff (2006)). One example of a selfishly motivated bequest is the 
strategic (or exchange) bequest motive proposed by Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 
(1985), whereby parents leave a bequest to their children to induce them to provide care, 
attention, and/or financial assistance during old age (see also Grossbard, 2014). Another 
example of a selfishly motivated bequest is the implicit intra-family annuity contract 
proposed by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) whereby parents agree to leave a bequest to 
their children in return for receiving a monthly stipend from them until they die. By 
contrast, altruistic parents will leave a bequest to their children unconditionally (i.e., 
whether or not their children provide anything in return). Thus, we can shed light on the 
applicability of the selfish life-cycle model by looking at data on bequest motives. 
 
The “Preference Parameters Study” of Osaka University that we referred to in the 
previous section collects information on bequest motives in four countries (China, India, 
Japan, and the United States). The survey asks “How do you feel about leaving an 
inheritance to your children?” and respondents are asked to select one of eight options. 
Two of the eight options (“I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what” 
and “I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because doing so may reduce their will to work”) are altruistic, while four (“I plan to 
leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care (including nursing care) 
during old age,” “I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide 
financial assistance during old age,” “I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an 
inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave whatever is left over,” and “I do not plan to 
leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because I want to use my 
wealth myself”) are selfish.   
 
Horioka (2014a,b) presents data on bequest motives from this survey for China, India, 
Japan, and the United States, and as can be seen from these papers, the proportion of 
respondents with an altruistic bequest motive is highest in India (75.80%) and also very 
high in the United States (66.97%), whereas this proportion is lowest in Japan (33.98%) 
and also relatively low in China (37.40%). By contrast, the proportion of respondents 
with a selfish bequest motive is highest in Japan (64.96%) and also relatively high in 
China (55.10%), whereas this proportion of lowest in India (21.82%) and also relatively 
low in the United States (32.76%). Thus, judging from the evidence on bequest motives, 
the Japanese are the most selfish among the four peoples and the Chinese are the next 
most selfish, whereas Indians are the most altruistic and Americans are the next most 
altruistic.  
 
Moreover, as the data presented in Horioka (2014a) show, data on bequest division point 
to the same conclusion (i.e., that the Japanese are the most selfish and the Chinese the 
second most selfish). However, in the case of bequest division, Americans and Indians 
change positions, with Americans being the most altruistic and Indians being the second 
most altruistic.   
 
Horioka, et al., (1998), Horioka, et al. (2000), Horioka (2002a,b), Horioka (2008b,c), 
and Horioka (2009) present similar data on bequest motives and bequest division from 




Finally, Alma’amun (2012) analyzes the bequest motives of Malaysian Muslims and 
finds that the bequest motives of Malaysian Muslims are largely altruistic (where the 
responses “To make them equally well off” and “To help them regardless of their 
economic status” are classified as altruistic), whereas dynastic and selfish (strategic) 
bequest motives are of roughly equal importance. 7 
 
Thus, not only do the Japanese leave fewer bequests than other peoples but their bequests 
are more selfishly motivated that those of other peoples. These findings suggest that the 




8. Evidence from Tests of Altruism 
 
The simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model assumes that individuals are selfish, 
not altruistic, so we can shed light on the applicability of this model by conducting tests 
of altruism. Thus, in this section, we survey papers that have conducted tests of altruism 
for the case of Japan and consider whether or not their findings are consistent with the 
selfish life-cycle model. 
 
First, we survey the literature that examines the impact of parental bequest motives on 
the caregiving behavior of children. If children are altruistic, they should provide care, 
attention, and financial assistance to their parents regardless of whether or not they 
expect to receive bequests from them. Conversely, if children are selfish, they should 
provide care, attention, and financial assistance to their parents only if they expect to 
receive bequests from them (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers’s (1985) strategic 
bequest motive).  
 
All such studies for Japan of which I am aware are consistent with the selfish life-cycle 
model rather than with the altruism model. For example,  
 
(1) Ohtake and Horioka (1994) find that the housing assets of parents have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the probability that their 
children live with them and that the financial net worth of parents has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the amount of the financial 
assistance children provide to their parents. 
 
(2) Komamura (1994) finds that the housing assets of parents have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the probability that their children live with 
them. 
 
(3) Yamada (2006) finds that whether or not children expect to inherit a house 
 
7 Alma’amun (2012) analyzes the motives for leaving bequests to family members who are excluded 
by Faraid (Islamic law) because the distribution of bequests among legal heirs is specified in detail 
in the Quran and Muslims have no discretion regarding this matter. 
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from their parents has a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
probability that their children live with them and on the frequency with which 
their children contact them and a negative and statistically significant impact 
on the distance between their own home and their children’s home. 
 
(4) Wakabayashi and Horioka (2009) find that whether or not parents are 
managers or homeowners has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the probability that their children live with them. 
 
(5) Kohara and Ohtake (2011) find that the educational attainment of parents has 
a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability that their 
children take care of them during old age.  
 
(6) Horioka, et al. (2018) find that whether or not children expect to receive a 
bequest from their parents has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the probability that they live with or near their parents and on the probability 
that they help their parents with housework.  
 
If parental assets, homeownership, occupation, and educational attainment are regarded 
as proxies for expected bequests from parents, all of the aforementioned findings suggest 
that the probability receiving bequests from parents and/or the expected amount of such 
bequests have a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of parents 
living with, or near, their children and on the probability of receiving care, attention, 
and/or financial assistance from their children. This, in turn, suggests that the Japanese 
are selfish, not altruistic.  
 
The seminal study on the impact of bequests on the amount of care and attention from 
one’s children is Bernheim et al. (1985), which finds, using data on American households 
from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS), that bequeathable wealth has 
a positive and significant impact on the frequency of phone calls and visits from one’s 
children in the case of families with two or more children, even after controlling for the 
parents’ age, health, and employment status, but that it has a negative and insignificant 
impact on the frequency of phone calls and visits in the case of families with only one 
child and that non-bequeathable wealth does not have a significant impact on the 
frequency of phone calls and visits in either sample. All of these results appear to support 
the selfish life-cycle model because only bequeathable wealth should influence the 
behavior of children and because parents’ threat of disinheritance is not credible if they 
have only one child.  
 
However, Perozek (1998) replicates Bernheim et al. (1985) test using a richer data set 
[the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH)] and finds that 
bequeathable wealth no longer has a significant impact on attention from one’s children 
when additional child and family characteristics are taken into account and/ or a more 




Laferrère and Wolff (2006) survey the literature from throughout the world on the impact 
of parental bequests on children’s caregiving behavior. They find that such research is 
the most prevalent in the United States and that two-thirds of such studies for the United 
States suggest that Americans are altruistic (see also Horioka (2014a)). Thus, our 
findings in this section are consistent with our earlier conclusion in section 7 that the 
Japanese are more selfish than Americans. 
 
As for studies for countries other than the United States, Laferrère and Wolff (2006) also 
survey studies for France, Germany, and Italy and finds that most studies for France 
reject altruism while two out of the three studies for Germany accept altruism, and the 
studies for Italy are inconclusive.  
 
Finally, there are at least three studies of bequest division behavior—one for Japan, one 
for China, and one for Tanzania. Hamaaki, et al. (2019) analyze the determinants of 
bequest division behavior in Japan using micro data from a unique survey and find that 
parents tend to bequeath more to children who are living with the surviving parent, 
which is consistent with the selfish life-cycle model, but that they do not necessarily 
bequeath more to economically disadvantaged children, which is evidence against the 
altruism model. 
 
Turning to studies for other countries, Jiang, et al. (2015) analyzes the bequest division 
behavior of rural households in China and find that they have mixed motives, with the 
likelihood of leaving bequests and the amount of the bequest being lower for children 
providing financial support but higher for children providing instrumental (in-kind) 
support. The first finding is consistent with the altruism model since children who 
provide financial support are presumably more affluent, but the second finding is 
consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
Similarly, Wineman and Liverpool-Tasie (2019) analyze the bequest division behavior 
of rural households in Tanzania and find strong evidence in support of the selfish life-
cycle model. For example, they find that parents with greater needs leave more to female 
children who reside nearby because they are more willing and able to provide attention 
and care to them and that they leave more to children who remit money or in-kind gifts. 
Moreover, they find little evidence in support of the altruism model: they find that 
parents do not favor children who are divorced or widowed (who are presumably more 
needy) and that they do not disfavor children with off-farm income. 
 
Thus, tests of altruism that are based on examining the interrelationship between parental 
bequest motives, bequest division, and the caregiving behavior of children indicate the 
presence of considerable heterogeneity across countries, and France and Tanzania seem 
to be two of the few countries other than Japan in which the findings are consistent with 
the selfish life-cycle model.  
 
Moreover, Hayashi (1995) conducts a completely different test of altruism using micro 
data from the “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure.” If parents and 
children are both altruistic, the two sides should pool their incomes when deciding how 
much to consume, and thus if one controls for the combined income of parents and 
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children, parental income or children’s income should not have any impact on total 
consumption. However, Hayashi (1995) finds, even after controlling for combined 
income by introducing fixed effects, that parental income and children’s income have a 
statistically significant impact on total consumption. This suggests that the Japanese are 
not pure altruists. 
 
Thus, all of the tests of altruism surveyed here suggest that Japanese individuals are 
selfish, not altruistic, and that the selfish life-cycle model applies in Japan to a greater 
extent than it does in the United States and other countries with the possible exception 
of France and Tanzania. 
 
 
9. Evidence on the Importance of Borrowing (Liquidity) Constraints 
 
In our brief exposition of the selfish life-cycle model in section 2, we assumed that 
individuals smooth their consumption over their lifetimes, but this result requires that 
capital markets are perfect and that borrowing (liquidity) constraints do not exist. Thus, 
we can shed light on the applicability of the selfish life-cycle model by looking at how 
important borrowing (liquidity) constraints are in the real world. In this section, we 
survey the literature on the importance of borrowing (liquidity) constraints in the case 
of Japan and consider whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-
cycle model (see Hayashi, 1985b, for a more general survey of this literature). 
 
Hayashi (1985a) and Watanabe, Watanabe, and Watanabe (2001) find that about 15% 
and 25% of Japanese households face borrowing (liquidity) constraints, respectively. 
Similarly, Kohara and Horioka (2006) find that 8 to 15% of young Japanese couples are 
borrowing (liquidity) constrained. Moreover, Horioka (2012a, b) and Horioka and Niimi 
(2020) find that the ratio of household liabilities to household disposable income in 
Japan was the highest among the Group of Seven (G7) countries until at least 2005.  
 
Thus, all of the existing evidence suggests that most Japanese households are not 
borrowing (liquidity) constrained, that borrowing constraints do not constrain them from 
smoothing consumption over their lifetimes, and that the selfish life-cycle model applies 
in the case of Japan.8 This conclusion is surprising at first glance because it is well 
known that, during the high-growth era from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s, the 
Japanese government funneled capital from households to firms to enable them to 
finance massive amounts of investment in plant and equipment and that consumer credit 
was largely unavailable. It must be borne in mind, however, that after economic growth 
slowed, loans to households for housing and automobile purchases and other purposes  






8 However, Ogawa (2007) finds that the proportion of households facing borrowing (liquidity) 
constraints has increased sharply since the mid-1990s. 
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10. Why Is There More Consistent Support for the Selfish Life-Cycle Model in 
Japan? 
 
The overall conclusion of this paper is that the selfish life-cycle model applies in all 
countries but that it is more applicable in Japan than it is in the United States and most 
other countries. This finding suggests at first glance that the Japanese are inherently 
(genetically) more rational, forward-looking, and selfish than other peoples, as these are 
the fundamental assumptions of the selfish life-cycle model, but this is not necessarily 
the case. In this section, we explore possible explanations for why there is more 
consistent support for the selfish life-cycle model in Japan than there is in most other 
countries. At least eleven possible explanations come to mind, and we group them by 
category into government policies, institutional factors, economic factors, demographic 





10.1. Underdeveloped Social Insurance System  
 
Japan had an underdeveloped social insurance system for much of the postwar system, 
with the public old-age pension system being expanded only in 1973 and the public long-
term care insurance system being introduced only in 2000. Moreover, the public old-age 
pension system has been scaled back in recent years, with the pensionable age being 
gradually increased from 60 to 65, contribution rates being gradually increased, and 
benefit levels being held down. Moreover, further reductions in benefit levels are likely 
as further population aging places further strains on the finances of the public old-age 
pension system. This means that a larger share of living expenses during retirement 
needs to be financed by one’s own assets in Japan, which in turn increases the need to 
save for life-cycle purposes (i.e. for living expenses during retirement). Thus, it could 
be that Japan’s underdeveloped social insurance system is one explanation for the greater 
importance of saving for retirement in Japan.  
 
10.2. High Inheritance Taxes 
 
Estate, bequest, or inheritance taxes are much higher in Japan than in other countries. 
For example, the maximum tax rate of the inheritance tax was already high (50%) but it 
was increased further to 55% in 2015, and there is also a comparable gift tax that is 
levied on inter vivos transfers. By contrast, there is no inheritance tax at all in China and 
the threshold for taxable bequests is very high in the United States, as a result of which 
only the very wealthy are required to pay inheritance taxes in the United States. Thus, it 
could be that higher inheritance taxes are one explanation for why bequests are less 
prevalent in Japan than in other countries. 
 
10.3. Relatively Early Retirement Age 
 
Japan has traditionally had a surprising early retirement age, although it has been 
gradually extended over time. During most of the postwar period, the compulsory 
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retirement age in Japan was only 55, which is much earlier than other developed 
countries. In 1986, the Japanese government amended the Act on Stabilization of 
Employment of Elderly Persons to provide various incentives for companies to raise 
their compulsory retirement age to 60. In 1994, the Act was further amended to legally 
prohibit companies from setting a compulsory retirement age below 60 beginning in 
1998, and to require companies to strive to secure employment opportunities for their 
employees until the age of 65 beginning in 2000. In 2004, the Act was further amended 
to require companies with a compulsory retirement age of less than 65 to gradually 
provide employment opportunities for all interested employees until the age of 65 
beginning in 2006, and in 2012, the Act was further amended to require companies to 
provide employment opportunities for all interested employees until the age of 65 
beginning in 2013, either by (a) raising the compulsory retirement age, (b) introducing 
a continued employment system whereby employees are re-hired on a contractual basis, 
or (c) abolishing their compulsory retirement age entirely. Note, moreover, that even 
though Japan’s compulsory retirement age has been raised over time, a compulsory 
retirement age of 65 has not yet been fully implemented, and even a compulsory 
retirement age of 65 is early by international standards (for example, the United States 
has completely abolished compulsory retirement for almost all occupations). A relatively 
early retirement age implies a relatively long retirement span, ceteris paribus, and our 
theoretical analysis in section 2 showed that a longer retirement span necessitates more 
life-cycle saving (saving for retirement). Thus, it could be that the relatively early 
retirement age in Japan is one explanation for the greater importance of saving for 





10.4. The Underdeveloped Financial System 
 
Japan has traditionally had a relatively underdeveloped financial system. For example, 
in Japan, lifetime annuities, long-term care insurance, and reverse mortgages are not 
provided by the private sector to the same extent as they are in other developed countries 
(see Horioka and Kanda, 2010, for more details). Private annuities are widely available 
but many, if not most, of them provide for benefits only up to a certain age, meaning that 
they do not provide full insurance against longevity risk. This makes it necessary for 
Japanese households to self-insure against medical and long-term care expenses during 
retirement and against lifespan uncertainty, assuming that social insurance systems do 
not fully insure Japanese households against such risks, and this could be one 






9 Note, however, that even though the compulsory retirement age in Japan is relatively early, many 
Japanese workers continue working after formal retirement (usually at greatly reduced wages) and 
that self-employed workers are not bound by the compulsory retirement age. 
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10.5. Unavailability of Nursing Homes and Professional Care Workers 
 
Nursing homes and professional care workers were, until recently, less available in Japan, 
meaning that parents had little choice but to rely on their children for care and assistance 
during old age, and this could be one explanation for why selfishly motivated strategic 
bequest motives are more prevalent in Japan than elsewhere. Note, however, that this 
explanation no longer applies because the supply of nursing homes and professional care 
workers has increased substantially in recent years and because Japan introduced a 





10.6. Rapid Economic Growth 
 
As we discussed briefly in section 2, the selfish life-cycle model predicts that the 
aggregate amount of life-cycle saving (saving for retirement) will be greater, the greater 
is the extent to which the lifetime incomes of workers exceeds the lifetime incomes of 
retirees because the aggregate amount of saving for retirement equals the saving for 
retirement of workers (which is presumably a function of their lifetime incomes) minus 
the dissaving for retirement of retirees (which is also presumably a function of their 
lifetime incomes). Thus, it could be that the rapid growth of household incomes during 
the high-growth era from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s is one explanation for the 
greater importance of saving for retirement in Japan during this period. 
 
Similarly, we would expect bequests to be smaller, the greater is the extent to which the 
lifetime incomes of the children’s generation exceeds the lifetime incomes of the parents’ 
generation because the faster the growth of household incomes, the less willing even 
altruistic parents will be to leave bequests to their children, who are more affluent than 
they are. Thus, it could be that the rapid growth of household incomes during the high-
growth era from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s is also one explanation for the lower 
prevalence of bequests in Japan during this period.  
 
However, neither of these explanations applies any longer since economic growth in 





10.7. The Young Age Structure of the Population 
 
As we showed in section 2, the selfish life-cycle model predicts that the aggregate 
amount of saving for retirement will be greater, the higher is the ratio of the retirement-
age population to the working-age population because workers are saving for retirement 
whereas retirees are dissaving for the same purpose. Moreover, as we pointed out in 
subsection 3.1, the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population 
in Japan was one of the lowest among the developed countries until the mid-1980s. Thus, 
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it could be that the unique age structure of Japan’s population is one explanation for the 
greater importance of life-cycle saving (saving for retirement), at least until the mid-
1980s. However, this explanation no longer applies since Japan is now virtually the most 
aged society in the world. 
 
10.8. Long Life Expectancy 
 
Life expectancy at birth in Japan has in recent years been virtually the longest in the 
world. For example, in 2019, it was 87.45 for females and 81.41 for males. The life 
expectancy of females was second only to Hong Kong, and that of males was the third 
highest in the world after Hong Kong and Switzerland (Asahi Shimbun, July 31, 2020). 
Thus, even assuming a retirement age of 65, the expected retirement span of Japanese 
females is 22.45 years and that of Japanese males is 16.41 years, and moreover, we need 
to bear in mind that the compulsory retirement age was only 60 until recently, meaning 
that the expected retirement span was even longer until recently. Our theoretical analysis 
in section 2 showed that a longer retirement span necessitates more life-cycle saving 
(saving for retirement), and thus it could be that the relatively long life expectancy at 
birth in Japan, which entails a longer retirement span, is one explanation for the greater 





10.9. Weak Religiosity 
 
As the data presented in Horioka (2014a) show, the Japanese are much less religious 
than Americans and Indians. If weaker religiosity makes people less altruistic, it may at 
least partly explain the lower prevalence of altruistically motivated bequests in Japan 
than in the United States and India. There is a vast literature on the impact of religiosity 
and religious affiliation on people’s economic attitudes and outcomes starting with Max 
Weber’s 1905 treatise on the Protestant ethic (Weber, 1905/2002) (see Guiso, et al. 
(2003), and McCleary and Barro (2006) for comprehensive surveys of this literature). 
For example, Barro and McCleary (2002) find that the extent of religious beliefs has a 
positive impact on economic growth. Similarly, Guiso, et al. (2003) conduct a careful 
econometric analysis of the impact of religiosity and religious affiliation on economic 
attitudes using data from the World Values Survey for a large number of countries and 
find that religious respondents differ significantly in their economic attitudes from non-
religious people (for example, they place greater emphasis on thrift), even after 
controlling for individual country effects.  
 
10.10. Social Norms concerning Parental Care 
 
Perhaps reflecting Confucian teachings concerning the importance of filial piety, the 
social norm in Japan has traditionally been for children (especially sons) to take care of 
their elderly parents, and this could be a partial explanation for why selfishly motivated 
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strategic bequest motives are more prevalent in Japan than in other countries.10 By 
contrast, in countries where this social norm is not as strong (for example, the United 
States), children will be less willing to take care of their elderly parents and hence there 
will be less scope for parents to induce their children to provide care by dangling a 
potential bequest in front of them.11  
 
10.11. Social Norms concerning Children’s Education and Marriage Expenses 
 
The social norm in Japan is for parents to pay the bulk of their children’s education and 
marriage expenses, and this could be one explanation for why Japanese parents are not 





In this section, we identified a large number of not only cultural factors but also 
government policies, institutional factors, economic factors, and demographic factors 
that are capable of explaining why there is more consistent support for the selfish life-
cycle model in Japan than there is in other countries. Thus, the fact that there is more 
consistent support for the selfish life-cycle model in Japan does not necessarily imply 
that the Japanese are inherently (genetically) more rational, forward-looking, and selfish 
than other peoples. Rather, it could be that there is more consistent support for the selfish 
life-cycle model in Japan because of various differences in government policies, 
institutional factors, economic factors, and demographic factors. Thus, it is not 
necessarily surprising that the selfish life-cycle model applies with greater force in a 
non-Western country like Japan with very different traditions, social norms, and culture 
and closer family ties, and  this finding can potentially be explained without relying on 
cultural or even genetic explanations (we will say more about this in the concluding 
section). However, an assessment of the relative importance of the various explanations 
for why there is more consistent support for the selfish life-cycle model in Japan than 
there is in most other countries remains as a topic for further research. 
 
 
11. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we first provided a brief exposition of the simplest version of the selfish 
life cycle model or hypothesis, which, together with the dynasty or altruism model, is 
undoubtedly the most widely used theoretical model of household behavior in 
 
10 Grossbard (2018) suggests that social norms regarding parental care may be influenced by the 
prevalence of dowries and brideprice. 
 
11  See Banerjee, et al. (2014) for an interesting analysis of how the social norm of children 
(especially sons) taking care of their parents has affected China’s household saving rate. 
 
12 Note, however, that parental assistance with children’s education and marriage expenses is a form 
of intergenerational transfer and that, strictly speaking, it should be included in the share of bequests 
broadly defined in total household wealth (see footnote 5). 
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economics. We then surveyed the literature on household saving behavior in Japan (with 
emphasis on the author’s own past research) to shed light on whether or not the selfish 
life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan. In particular, we surveyed the literature on 
a wide variety of approaches including not only studies of saving behavior (e.g., studies 
of the impact of the age structure of the population on the saving rate, the saving 
behavior of the retired elderly, saving motives, and the importance of borrowing 
(liquidity) constraints) but also studies of bequest behavior (e.g., studies of the 
prevalence of bequests, bequest motives, and tests of altruism). Almost all of the 
available evidence suggested that the selfish life-cycle model applies to at least some 
extent in all countries but that there is more consistent support for this model in Japan 
than there is in the United States and other countries. Thus, the answer to the question 
posed in the title of this paper is an unqualified “yes.” 
 
Needless to say, selfish behavior and altruistic behavior coexist in all countries, and 
Japan is no exception. Fumio Hayashi, the foremost authority on Japanese saving 
behavior, concludes his survey paper on this topic as follows (Hayashi (1997a), p. 322): 
 
“We can now profitably contemplate what sort of model is best suited for explaining 
these stylized facts [about Japanese household saving behavior]. It has become clear that 
intergenerational linkages through the exchange of nonmarket services and through 
altruism will be an essential ingredient.” 
 
Moreover, Hayashi makes the following assertion elsewhere in the same paper 
(Hayashi(1997a), p. 319): “[b]oth the exchange and altruistic motives are important for 
explaining [Japanese household saving behavior].” 
 
The current author agrees completely with Hayashi but strongly feels that selfish 
behavior is more prevalent in Japan than altruistic behavior and that there is more 
consistent support for the selfish life-cycle model in Japan than there is in the United 
States and other countries.  
 
This paper then explored possible explanations for why there is more consistent support 
for the selfish life-cycle model in Japan than there is in other countries, attributing this 
finding to government policies, institutional factors, economic factors, demographic 
factors, and cultural factors.  
 
Some readers may be surprised to learn that there is more consistent support for the 
selfish life-cycle model in Japan than there is in the United States and other countries 
because Japan is a non-Western country with very different traditions, social norms, and 
institutions and closer family ties. However, it must be borne in mind that the fact that 
family ties are close does not necessarily imply that family members harbor feelings of 
altruism toward one another. It could be that family ties are closer in Japan than in most 
other countries but that they are motivated by strategic rather than altruistic 
considerations (see Horioka (2019) for a more extensive discussion of the impact of 
culture on the saving and bequest behavior of the Japanese). Moreover, there are a large 
number of other differences between Japan and other countries with respect to 
government policies, institutional factors, economic factors, and demographic factors 
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that are capable of explaining the greater applicability of the selfish life-cycle model in 
the case of Japan without having to resort to cultural or even genetic explanations. 
 
Note, moreover, that even if social norms were a partial explanation for the greater 
applicability of the selfish life-cycle model in the case of Japan, it should be noted that 
social norms are not immutable and that they are shaped by the policy, institutional, 
economic, and demographic environment of the country. For example, the social norm 
of children taking care of their elderly parents may have arisen partly because of the 
unavailability of nursing homes and professional care workers and the absence of a 
public long-term care insurance program and it may now be weakening partly in 
response to the increased supply of nursing homes and professional care workers and 
the introduction of a public long-term care program in 2000 (see Horioka (2019) for a 
more detailed discussion of this argument). 
 
Finally, we would like to consider the implications of our finding that the selfish life-
cycle model applies in the case of Japan. This conclusion has at least five important 
implications for economic modeling and for government tax and expenditure policies:  
 
(1) When constructing theoretical models to describe Japanese household 
behavior, one should construct models that assume that households are selfish 
rather than altruistic or models that assume that selfish households and 
altruistic households coexist. 
 
(2) As population aging progresses even further in Japan, Japan’s household 
saving rate can be expected to decline ever further. This is likely to lead to 
substantial capital shortages, which in turn may necessitate fiscal 
reconstruction measures designed to reduce the large deficits (negative saving) 
of the government sector and may also lead to Japan running current account 
deficits rather than current account surpluses. 
 
(3) Our finding implies that Ricardian equivalence does not apply in the case of 
Japan, meaning that the Japanese Government may be able to stimulate the 
economy by implementing tax cuts that are financed by the issuance of 
government bonds (Barro, 1974), but it is, of course, possible that such 
policies would not be effective even if Ricardian equivalence does not apply. 
 
(4) Our finding that bequests are motivated primarily by strategic or exchange 
considerations in Japan implies that they are accompanied by some sort of quid 
pro quo such as care, attention, and financial assistance during old age. This, 
in turn, implies that, in Japan, bequests from parents to children will be largely 
offset by transfers in the opposite direction (from children to parents), meaning 
that net transfers from parents to children will not necessarily be large or even 
positive and that wealth disparities will not necessarily be transmitted from 
generation to generation (from parents to children).13 
 
13 However, Niimi and Horioka (2018) find that individuals receiving bequests are more likely to 




(5) Our finding that bequests are motivated primarily by strategic or exchange 
considerations in Japan implies that the introduction of a public long-term care 
insurance system in 2000 may have led to a reduction in the prevalence of 
bequests because parents no longer need to rely on their children for care 
during old age to the same extent as in the past.  
 
Thus, whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan is important 
not only from an intellectual perspective but also from a policy perspective, and thus 
further work on this topic is of urgent need. I am therefore planning to continue my 
research on this topic as I enter the retirement phase of my own life cycle.  
 
In the case of Japan, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have not been widely used in 
studies of household consumption, saving, and bequest behavior. This is a promising 
avenue for further research, but as Ravallion (2020) has pointed out, this methodology 
is not necessarily the best methodology in all cases, and it should be used only if it is the 
best methodology for the question at hand. As Ravallion writes, “The gold standard is 
the best method for the question at hand.” 
 
Given that the Covid-19 pandemic is the most pressing issue currently facing the world 
economy, I would like to close this article by speculating about how the pandemic will 
alter the extent to which the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan and 
other countries. First, the pandemic and the policies implemented to counteract the 
pandemic have caused many people to be laid off, to lose their jobs entirely, and/or to 
suffer sharp drops in their income. This has forced many of them to finance their living 
expenses by drawing down their previously accumulated wealth and will reduce the 
amount of wealth that they can accumulate for their retirement years, but it will also 
reduce the amount of wealth they can leave to their children in the form of inter vivos 
transfers and bequests. 
 
Second, until the pandemic subsides, children will presumably become less likely to live 
with, and/or to provide care to, their parents in order to avoid infecting them with the 
virus, and this may cause the selfish strategic bequest motive and thence the selfish life-
cycle model to become less applicable. 
 
Thus, it is clear that the pandemic will have a pervasive impact on people’s economic 
behavior, but it is not clear whether it will cause the selfish life-cycle model to become 
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parents to children. 
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Figure 1: The Selfish Life-Cycle Model
                      Y
Cumulative saving during working years













The contribution of a high income growth rate +0.45 +0.47
The contribution of a low retirement-age population ratio +5.45 +6.90
The contribution of a low dependent-age population ratio +1.64 +1.07
The contribution of a high labor force participation rate of the
elderly
-3.94 -3.89
The contribution of a low per capita income level +4.36 +1.29
Subtotal +7.96 +5.85
Unexplained residual +2.90 +0.95
Total private saving rate gap +10.86 +6.80
Table 1: A Decomposition of the Private Saving Rate Gap between Japan and Other
Countries
Source: Horioka (1986, 1989)









Figure 2: Trends over Time in Japan’s Household Saving Rate, 1955-2018 
 
 
Note: This figure shows trends over time in the household saving rate, which is  
     defined as household saving as a share of household disposable income (in 
percent). 
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of  
Japan, “Annual Report on National Accounts,” various issues. 
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Saving Motive Japan (1994) Japan (1996) U.S. (1996)
Retirement 62.50 62.23 30.84
Precautionary 55.99 41.18 27.93
Children's education 8.93 8.77 -0.14
Children's marriage 7.52 7.31 2.87
Housing purchase -20.21 -15.57 14.60
Consumer durable purchases -3.75 1.54 4.20
Leisure -0.44 2.44 6.35
Payment of taxes -1.54 0.25 6.40
Independent business 0.10 -0.37 2.59
Bequests 3.23 1.50 5.04
Other -12.33 -9.29 -0.66
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 3: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Share of Net Saving for Each Motive
Note: The figures denote the share of net saving for each motive in total household saving
(in percent). The figure for "Precautionary" denotes the sum of the figures for "Illness" and
"Peace of mind."
Sources: Horioka (1998, 1999) and Horioka, et al. (1998, 2000).
 
